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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the recent dramatic increase in the
ratio of US non-financial debt to GNP.It concludes that it is
largely the result of federal budget deficits. There does not
appear to have been a major change in traditional patterns of
private sector borrowing in recent years. The excessive
accumulation of Federal debt probably threatens financial






Events of the last few years have led to increasing concern
about the possible adverse consequences of the substantial
accumulation of debt by key sectors of the American economy.
Fears are often expressed that excessive private debt burdens
will threaten financial stability, with adverse consequences for
the real economy, or that increases in debt will create political
pressures that will make an acceleration of inflation inevitable.
A combination of a rapidly rising ratio of total indebtedness to
GNP and videspread financial distress manifested most vividly in
the Continental Illinois bank failure, the agricultural-sector of
the American economy, and problematic foreign loans, has led to
calls for policy action to head off debt problems. Henry Kaufman
(1986,p.52) for example, has labelled the rapid growth of debt as
"one of the most pressing problems of the day". And one study
group has urged that we "fix the roof while the sun is shining"
(Center for a New Democracy, 1986).
Debt problems have both a micro and a macroeconomic
dimension. The case for microeconomic policies directed at
limiting the indebtedness of firms and households is easily made
on the basis of standard externality arguments. In an
interdependent economy, the failure of any institution has
pervasive consequences for the remainder of the economy,
consequences which cannot be internalized by the affected
parties. Creditors represent only one class of losers when a
large corporation or bank fails. When a corporation fails, a2
network of employees, customers, and suppliers, all of whom have
made investments in anticipation of the corporation's continued
viability, suffer as well. And in a world where information is
far from perfect, the failure of any one company inevitably
creates doubts about the solvency of others, making it harder for
them to attract capital and enter into long term relationships
with customers and suppliers.In addition to these types of
costs, the failure of a bank imposes direct costs on the
government because of deposit insurance.
The externalities associated with financial failure make it
unlikely that any laissez faire policy twards the accumulation
of debt will be optimal. The private costs of taking on
increased debt almost certainly do not reflect the full social
costs that are imposed by the increased risk of financial
failure. This creates some presumption in favor of regulatory
and other microeconomic policies directed at preventing the
excessive accumulation of debt, especially in sectors of the
economy like banking where the externalities ar.e likelyto be
large. But regulation imposes costs of its own and in many cases
requires information that government is unlikely to possess orbe
able to obtain easily. It is reasonable to ask therefore whether
there are alternative macroeconomic policies which could
complement microeconomic measures by altering the environment so
as to make the accumulation of debt less attractive. Evenif
macroeconomic policy can do little to alleviate debt problems, it
should surely be sensitive to their existence.3
This paper explores the issue of monetary and fiscal policy
responses to possible debt problems. In considering debt
problems, I draw a sharp distinction between private and public
sector debt. The excessive accumulation of private sector debt
is a source of concern primarily because of default risks. For
th foreseeable future the risk of explicit default is not a
serious concern with respect to the buildup of Federal debt.
Rather, distortion in the composition of economic activity is the
primary problem posed by Federal deficits.
The first part of the paper considers the relationship
between monetary Dolicies and the accumulation of debt in the
private sector. I begin by assessing the usefulness of credit
aggregates in the setting of monetary policy. Following the
decision of the Federal Reserve in 1983 to monitor domestic
non-financial debt as an intermediate target, increasing
attention has focused on the debt to CNP ratio as an object of
policy.I review the evolution of this ratio briefly, noting its
recant extreme instability. Then I argue that while it may have
some value as a cyclical indicator, a number of definitional and
conceptual problems preclude its usage as a gauge of risks to
financial stability. More generally, it appears that monetary
policy as distinct from regulatory policy is too blunt a tool to
be useful in preventing debt problems. However, when debt
problems do surface, the Fed has a crucial role as a "lender of
last resort".
Recent years have witnessed an increased degree of financial4
distress. However, this distress is for the most part a
concomitant of sharp disinflation and major changes in the
sectoral composition of output. It is not primarily the result
of excessive financial leverage. If policies restricting growth
in non-financial debt had been in place over the last five years,
they would have exacerbated the costs of disinflation.
The second part of the paper examines the relationship
between fiscal policies and debt problems.I argue that rapid
increases in government debt burdens such as those experienced
recently in the United States have potentially serious
consequences for long term economic growth because of their
crowding out effects. They may also exacerbate the debt problems
of the private sector by pushing real interest rates upwards and
causing sectoral dislocations.
Beyond the effects of the total level of tax collections on
the government deficit, the structure of taxation exerts an
important impact on financial structure. Because much more
interest paid is reported on tax returns and deducted than
interest received is reported and taxed, the tax system works to
encourage the issuance of debt.The tax incentive to issue debt
for corporations at least is likely to be increased by the tax
reforms currently under consideration. However, tax reforms that
moved in the direction of consumption taxation could
significantly reduce the tax incentive to leverage.
The paper concludes by arguing that the buildup of debt is a
inicroeconomic but not a major macroeconomic problem.5
Macroeconomic policies that maintain the real economy on an even
keel would help to enhance financial stability. Beyond this,
there is little scope for macroeconomic policy to address
concerns about financial stability.
MONETARY POLICY, CREDIT GROWTH AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
The maintenance of financial stability has been a priority
of the Federal Reserve since its inception. The current
combination of disinflation, high real interest rates, financial
deregulation and severe sectoral dislocations has brought the
problem of financial stability into sharp policy focus. While
monetary policy has traditionally focused on monetary aggregates
and interest rates as intermediate targets in its attempts to
assure steady growth and price stability, recently attention has
also focused on credit aggregates. Following demonstrations by
Friedman (1982) that there had been a stable relationship over
many years between the level of total domestic non-financial debt
and nominal GNP, and that the linkages between this credit
aggregate and GNP was as close as the relationship between
nominal GNP and the traditional money aggregates, the Federal
Reserve in 1983 decided to set monitoring ranges for this
aggregate.
1
Since the Federal Reserve's announcement, the debt-GNP
relationship has broken down. Over the last three years,6
non-financial debt has grown at an average rate of over 12
percent, exceeding the upper end of the monitoring rangein each
year. Since 1981, the ratio ofnon-financial debt to GNP has
risen by 22 percentage points after varying within a 13
percentage point range over the wholeof the 1952-1980 period.
The seemingly anomalous behavior of the debt aggregate and recent
strains on the financial system raise obvious questions for
policy. Does the unusual pattern exhibited by thedebt-GNP ratio
recently represent a cause for concern? Are changes indebt
ratios likely to be useful forecasters of future financial
problems? If so, what monetary policy response iscalled for?
take up these questions in turn.
Explaining Movements in the Debt-CNP Ratio
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the totaldebt-CNP
ratio over the 1952-1985 period, along with movements in several
of its components. The unprecedented movement in the total
debt-GNP ratio in recent years is evident as is its remarkable
stability over the 1952-1980 period. Friedman (1982)noted the
stability of the debt-GNP ratio and stressed that totaldebt
appeared to be much more closely related to GNP than to anyof
its components. He went on to offer several hypotheses regarding
the reasons for stability in the debt-GNP ratio. On theview
that the debt-GNP ratio tends to revert towards some long run















































































































































































































































alarming. It presages either rapid inflation tending to reduce
the value of the debt relative to GNP, or a wave of defaults
tending to bring the value of outstanding debt back in line with
CNP. Either would be a cause for serious concern.
Studying the figure with the benefit of recent experience
suggests an interpretation of the evolution of debt and GNPwhich
is less alarming than Friedman's. It may be that there has been
a secular, relatively steady trend towards increased private
sector indebtedness, which only coincidentally was offset by a
declining ratio of government debt to GNP up until 1980. On this
view, there is nothing very surprising about the recent behavior
of the total debt to GNP ratio. Increases in private debt have
continued since 1980, but the long term decline in the Federal
debt-GNP ratio has been reversed. And, there is no particular
cause for concern about the solvency of the private sector.
In order to assess the validity of this alternative view, Figures
2a, 2b, and 2c present some evidence on trends in the ratio of
household, business and total private debt to GNP. In each case,
the values during the mid-l980s are quite close to what would
have been predicted on the basis of secular trends. There is no
indication that either businesses or households have deviated
from long term patterns in recent years. The aberrant behavior
of the ratio of total debt to GNP appears to be almost entirely
the result of increases in Federal borrowing. As I discuss
below, the rapid growth of the national debt during the l980s is


















































































































































































































































































































the financial stability of the private sector.
It could be argued that the conclusion that nothing unusual
has happened to private sector indebtedness is misleading because
one would expect, as Friedman originally argued, that increases
in Federal borrowing would curtail private borrowing. On this
view, the failure of private debt ratios to grow less rapidly
than normal in recent years should be a source of concern. An
easy way to test this idea is to see whether there historically
has been a tendency for increases in government debt to be offset
by reductions in private debt, once allowance is made for trends.
Table 1 presents a number of regression equations for both the
1953-1985 and the 1953-1980 periods relating the private debt-CNP
ratio to the Federal government debt-GNP ratio, Its lags, and a
simple time trend.
The results suggest that there is no systematic historical
tendency for increases in Federal indebtedness to be offset by
reductions in private sector indebtedness. Equations estimated
through 1985 suggest that after controlling for the trend,.
increases in government debt are actually associated with -
increasesin private debt. Even the equations estimated through
1980 do not reveal any statistically significant negative
relationship between government and private debt accumulation.
Moreover, the point estimates suggest that any effect of
increases in public debt on private debt is relatively modest.
Quite similar results are obtained from alternative
specifications using logarithms of the debt ratio variables, andTable I
The Relation Between Government and Private Debt Ratios
1952-1985
COVDEBTGOVDEBT(-l) GOVDEBT(-2) TIME RHO R2
.281 .013 .834 .981
(.166) (.003) (.085)
.466 -.276 .012 .780 .980
(.120) (.242) (.002) (.010)
.572 -.592 .678 .012 .883 .984
(.178) (.216) (.195) (.006) (.079)
1952-1980
GOVDEBT G0'JDEBT(-1) GOVDEBT(-2) TIME RHO R2
-.154 .008 .816 .983
(.229) (.004) (.096)
-.038 -.352 .005 .784 .981
(.249) (.231) (.004) (.109)
.228 -.502 .363 .009 .844 .978
(.323) (.277) (.290) (.006) (.109)
The table presents regressions of total private debt on a constant, a
time trend, and lags of total government debt. Total private debt
and total government debt are expressed as a percentage of GNP4
GOVDEBT(-l) and GOVDEBT(-2) are one and two period lags of total
government debt. TIME is the coefficient on the time trend, and RHO
is the AR(l) coefficient. Standard errors are in parentheses.9
various components of the private and government debt ratios.
This evidence suggests that rather than there being a stable
ratio of total debt to CNP, private sector debt has trended
upwards relative to GNP largely independently of the behavior of
government debt.2 Such an empirical conclusion is consistent
with received economic theory. There is little reason to expect
stability in the ratio of private debt to GNP or to expect that
it will be systematically negatively related to increases in
Federal debt. Leaving aside the foreign sector, which even today
holds only a negligible fraction of total US financial
liabilities, private debt is a purely inèide obligation.
Increases in debt on one part of the private sector's balance
sheet are tautologically related to increases in assets on
another part of the balance sheet. The level of both assets and
liabilities in the economy will depend largely on the extent of
intermediation in the economy, a variable about which economic
theory makes few predictions.
Friedman, on the contrary, suggests a number of possible
mechanisms through which the debt-GNP might tend to be
stabilized relying alternatively on ultrarationality, limits on
collateral, and limits on the substitutability of assets in
Individual portfolios. Even on the unlikely supposition that
households were ultra-rational in the sense of David and Scadding
(1974) and Barro (1974) and saw through the government sector
fully, it is unlikely that they would decrease their liabilities
dollar for dollar when the government issued debt. Rather they10
would increase their asset holdings in anticipation of future tax
obligations. Recall that the private sector as a whole cannot
affect its wealth position by issuing less debt since private
sector debt is a purely inside asset.
Nor is it likely that increases in the supply of government
debt would reduce the private sector's ability to take on debt.
Government debt surely represents as good collateral as any
tangible assets that it might crowd out. It is hard to see why
one should expect the private sector's willingness to both hold
and issue debt obligations of the non-financial sectors to be
reduced when government indebtedness rises. Any set of risk
preferences that asset holders might have would presumably
condition their notgross, holdings of financial assets and
liabilities.
A fair conclusion seems to be that what has happened to the
debt-GNP ratio in recent years is not surprising given the fiscal
policies followed by the Federal government. Both empirical
evidence and theoretical considerations support the judgment that
the private-sector's long term trend towards increased
indebtedness has continued largely independently of the actions
of the Federal government. Although the private sector's debt
ratio has not behaved aberrantly in recent years, the question of
whether its secular increase poses problems remains, as does the
question of whether a policy response would be appropriate if in
the future it were to show large unexpected movements.11
Financial Stability and the Credit Aggregates
The debt ratio monitored by the Federal Reserve is the sum
of all the debt issued by the non-financial sectors of the
economy. In thinking about financial stability, it is clearly
necessary to treat very differently the debt issued by private
households and firms and Federal debt. Only the former is
plausibly likely to lead to financial distress.I therefore
focus on the question of whether or not the ratio of aggregate
debt to GNP for the household and business sectors is likely to
be a very satisfactory proxy for future financial risks.I also
consider the closely related question of whether in an aggregate
sense the business and household sectors of the economy are
overly leveraged.
The most obvious problem with using debt-GNP ratios to
measure financial risks is that they ignore the asset side of the
balance sheet. Careful evaluations of potential debt problems
such as Benjamin Friedman's contribution to this volume have long
recognized the importance of simultaneously considering both
sides of the balance sheet. Non-academic evaluations of
financial stability have sometimes been less careful. Many types
of transactions which are innocuous from the point of view of
financial stability because they lead to equal increases in
assets and liabilities will lead to increases in debt ratios.
For example, if a corporation issues debt in order to fund its
pension obligations, the measured debt ratio will increase with12
little consequence for financial stability. If corporations make
increased use of bank as opposed to trade credit,, their debt
ratio will increase while financial stability is actually
enhanced. If households borrow in order to take advantage of
attractive investment opportunities, to make IRA contributions or
to engage in other forms of tax-favored savings, their measured
debt will increase without important consequence for financial
stability. A similar pattern will be observed if, as has been
the case recently, households make increased convenience use of
credit cards. Without knowing why the debt to GNP ratio has
moved, it is impossible to make inferences about financial
stability.
While movements-in the debt-GNP ratio need not have
important implications for financial stability, it is alsothe
case that developments with important consequences for financial
stability are likely to leave little trace in debt-GNP ratios.
When the assets of a sector decline in value relative to its
liabilities, the risks of default are increased but the ratio of
liabilities to GNP need not decline. This point is vividly
illustrated by the farm sector of the US economy. While
financial distress is painfully evident, the ratio of farm sector
credit market liabilities to GNP has declined by 25 percent over
the last five years. The point is very general. Fundamentally,
financial solvency has to do with differences between assets and
liabilities. Measures which look only at liabilities are not
likely to be especially useful in assessingfinancial risks.13
While the debt-GNP ratio may at times move in tandem with
the degree of financial distress, the preceding considerations
suggest that it is hardly satisfactory as an indicatorof the
degree of distress. Examining net worth rather than total
liabilities on a sectoral basis is likely to provide a much
better indicator of the risks of financial distress. Viewed in
this light, it is unlikely that recent increases in debt pose
serious risks. The dramatic increase in the stock market over
the past three years has improved the net worth of both the
corporate and household sectors. Even making some allowancefor
differences in the distributions of assets and liabilities within
sectors, it is hard to see how the risks of default could have
increased a great deal recently. Indeed, the impressive feature
of recent experience is that a period of sharp disinflation and
unprecedentedly high real interest rates has been associated with
so little financial distress outside of parts of the economythat
have experienced adverse sectoral shocks.
A point of major concern in many discussions of financial
stability has been the sharp increase in recent years in the use
of junk bonds, particularly in the context of hostile takeovers.
In assessing the risks posed by junk bond financing, two points
frequently ignored in popular discussions should be recalled.
First, the vast majority of junk bond financing has not been
associated with hostile takeovers. The total volume of new issue
high-yield debt grew from $1.7 billion in 1981 to $19.8billion
in 1985, while new issue debt for takeovers was only $1.6 billion14
in the first half of 1986. In many cases, it is likely that junk
bond financing was used by companies as a substitute for more
expensive bank debt. In these cases, it probably enhanced
financial stability. Second, as Jensen (1986) persuasively
argues, in many cases where junk bond financing substitutes for
the use of equity it improves capital market efficiency. Where
fixed debt obligations constrain managers from investing in
marginal projects, and so force more investments to meet market
tests, they probably improve the allocation of investment in the
economy.•
The preceding discussion does not imply that current
concerns about financial stability are wholly unwarranted.
Strains on the financial system are an inevitable concomitant of
the sharp disinflation of recent years. The agricultural and
energy sectors of the economy, along with parts of the
manufacturing sector, are in difficult straits. But these
problems reflect the very large adverse demand shocks that have
buffetted these sectors in recent years and the effects of high
real interest rates more than they reflect a systematic pattern
of over-borrowing. There is little basis for generalized
concerns about the excessive growth of private sector debt.
The point may be made in another way. Suppose that policy
makers, either through direct credit controls, or indirect
monetary policies, had restricted the growth of debt in recent
years. Marginal borrowers would have been rationed outof credit
markets. No doubt, some would have failed. Others would have15
survived but cut back on new capital outlays, reducing the total
level of demand in the economy. It is very likely that
restrictions on debt growth would have raised rather than lowered
the costs of disinflation.
Monetary Policy and Credit Aggregates
It might be argued however that debt ratios, even if they
are not useful predictors of financial distress, are useful in
predicting movements in GNP. As a huge econometric literature
documents there are literally hundreds of variables with some
predictive power for GNP over some intervals. The crucial issue
is whether or not there is a strong reason to expect movements in
the debt ratio to have a causal influence on GNP. The financial
distress arguments just considered would, if anything, tend to
suggest that increases in the debt-GNP ratio would tend to
precede downturns associated with financial problems.
On the other hand, arguments linking economic activity to
credit availability such as those of Vojnilower (1980) and
Blinder and Stiglitz (1982) would tend to suggest that increases
in debt ratios should be associated with subsequent strength in
GNP. If as these authors suggest, various informational
imperfections lead to credit rationing at relatively rigid
interest rates, it may be necessary to look at the quantity of
loans being made as well as their price to gauge the effects of
monetary policy on the real economy.However, it •is hard to see16
why credit availability doctrines would justify looking at an
aggregate which included government debt and freely traded long
term securities. Credit availability theories would suggest
investigating much narrower aggregates linked to the parts of the
financial system where credit might plausibly be rationed. A
measure of total bank credit would seem more suitable but
Friedman (1982) reports that the empirical evidence linking such
measures to GNP fluctuations is very weak. On balance, there is
no obvious reason for expecting movements in the total debt to
CNP ratio to systematically lead either to booms or busts.
All economic indicators contain some information which is
useful in assessing the future course of the economy and in
guiding policy. But the foregoing analysis suggests that the
debt-GNP ratio is probably not an especially useful indicator for
guiding monetary policy. Because it focuses on only one side of
the balance sheet, it is unlikely to be a reliable predictor of
either future financial distress or economic fluctuations. As
the recent experience with monetary targettinghas taught us,
reliance on any simple aggregate in unwise. Friedman is correct
in noting that conventional monetary aggregates also examine only
one side of the balance sheet. Like credit aggregates, they do
not provide a very satisfactory basis for conducting monetary
policy.
One way to see the problem with making use of a credit
aggregate in setting monetary policy is to consider a basic
question. In which direction should the knowledge that debt17
growth has been rapid in recent years influence policy? To the
extent that it occasions fears of spreading default, the
appropriate macroeconomic policies are expansionary. To the
extent that credit growth presages rapid growth in nominal GNP,
unexpectedly, as Friedman argues has been true historically large
growth may call for contractionary policies to raise interest
rates and reduce debt growth.
This ambiguity sharply distinguishes credit and monetary
aggregates.A finding that money has grown rapidly may or may
not be an indication that policies to reduce its growth are in
order, depending on whether the money demand function is thought
to have shifted. But it is difficult to imagine circumstances in
which rapid past growth of money would suggest that more
expansionary Federal Reserve policies were called foi. On the
other hand, rapid growth in the credit aggregates can easily
occur in situations, where very expansionary policies are
appropriate, because of the risk of financial panics.
As the example of the Depression makes abundantly clear, the
Federal Reserve has a crucial role to play as lender of last
resort. Declines in confidence can be both contagious and
self-fufilling in a tightly knit financial system like that of
the United States. The willingness of the Federal Reserve to act
decisively to preserve confidence is crucial to the maintenance
of stability. While crucial to stability, the willingness of the
Federal Reserve and the government more generally to take actions
to restore confidence in times of crisis no doubt encourages18
private sector risk taking. This is part of the case, noted in
the introduction, for regulatory policies directed at financial
stability. It is very unlikely however that by tracking the
debt-GNP ratio or any other financial aggregate that monetary
policy can do much to maintain stability.
THE FEDERAL DEFICIT PROBLEM
As Figure 1 illustrated the behavior of the private sector in
taking on debt during the 1980's has been consistent with long
term historical trends. On the other hand, recent years have
seen a sharp departure from long term trends in the behavior of
the Federal deficit. .Thedownwards trend in the ratio of the
national debt to GNP which continued essentially without
interruption during the 30 years following World War II, has been
reversed in the 1980's. The ratio of outstanding government debt
to GNP has risen sharply from 37% in 1980 to 53% in 1985, and is
likely to continue to increase for the next two years even on
very optomistic projections. It is this behavior which gives
rise to the "Reagan parabola" in the graph of government debt-GNP
ratio.
It is important to clarify the dimensions in which the
Federal deficit represents a serious economic problem. Unlike
the debt of the private sector, Federal debt has almost unlimited
backing- -the government's capacity to tax. The risk of explicit
default by the Federal government is not an important one for the19
foreseeable future, nor is their much reason to fear that the
private sector will lose confidence and become unwilling to hold
Federal debt. Rather the continued growth in Federal
indebtedness is primarily a problem because of its impact in
distorting the composition of GNP and reducing its growth in the
long run.I begin by considering the Federal deficit's impact on
the level and composition of GNP and then suggest that through
its effects on interest rates and the composition of economic
activity, the Federal deficit may indirectly exacerbate the debt
problems of the private sector. The distorting effects of
Federal debt on the composition of GNP has probably caused more
financial distress than the build-up of private debt in recent
years.
Federal Deficits and the Level of Economic Activity
Economists have long debated the pure effects of
expansionary fiscal policies. Opinions have fluctuated through
time though it is fair to say that the consensus estimate of the
fiscal policy multiplier has declined fairly steadily since World
War II under the influence of increasing evidence of the interest
sensitivity of aggregate demand and the interest insensitivity of
money demand. The increasing recognition that expansionary
policies lead to price increases has also contributed to
reductions in estimates of the fiscal multiplier.
The relevance of these debates about pure fiscal policies to20
the analysis of actual deficit policies is questionable. The
impact of deficits depends critically on what monetary policies
accompany them. A homely analogy illustrates the point. Suppose
one were interested in the effect of making a car more powerful
on the speed at which it would be driven. What should be held
constant, the degree of pressure the driver applies to the
accelerator, the setting of the transmission or the speed limit
she respects? Clearly the question of the effect of a more
powerful car on driving speed is meaningless without a
specification of what is to be held constant.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the fiscal multiplier can vary
between zero and quite substantial values, depending on what
monetary policy holds constant in the face of deficits.If the
Federal Reserve acts to maintain the level of nominal CNP,
fluctuations in the deficit will have no effect on the level of
output. On the other hand, if they act to maintainthe level of
interest rates, the multiplier is likely to be quite large. On
the assumption that they maintain the level ofthe money stock,
standard analysis suggests that the multiplier will have an
intermediate value.3
Academic controversies about the effects of fiscal policy
have centered on the magnitude of the multiplier on this last
assumption that the money stock is held constant. Itis far from
clear that this is a very realistic assumption about the monetary
policy response to changes in Federal deficits in thecurrent
policy environment, where monetary policy is no longerdirectedr
FIGURE 3
Fiscal Policy Effects











at pegging the monetary aggregates.4 The difficult issue for the
analysis of fiscal policy is deciding what alternative reaction
function is more plausible to use for monetary policy. My
preference is for the assumption that the Federal Reserve seeks
to maintain a nominal GNP target in the face of fiscal shocks.
That is1 it offsets any expansionary impact of deficits with
contractionary monetary policies. This assumption is appropriate
if monetary policy is selected to balance economic growth and
inflation. Fiscal expansions which do not shift the tradeoff
between inflation and growth will not lead to the choice of a
different level of GNP.Even if the assumption that the Federal
Reserve acts to stabilize nominal GNP in the face of changes in
deficits is not completely accurate as a predictive theory, it is
still a useful benchmark for the analysis of fiscal policy. It
permits isolation of the effects of deficits on the composition
of CNP. In the long run when wages and prices are flexible,
these effects are likely to be the primary consequences of fiscal
policies.
Fiscal Deficits and the Composition of GNP
The effects of fiscal deficits on the composition of GNP are
a subject of continuing controversy. If GNP remains constant
following an increase in government deficits, some other
component of spending, consumption, investment, or net exports
must be crowded out. The conventional view embodied in most22
textbooks is that increases in government deficits, arising from
tax cuts for example, increase the demand for goods.If monetary
policy maintains a fixed level of output, interest ratesrise to
choke off the additional demand created by deficits. Increased
intprest rates reduce investment demand. Theyalso lead to
capital inflows from abroad, which cause an exchange rate
appreciation, which in turn leads to increases in importdemand
and reductions in export demand.
This view of the effects of budget deficits has been
challenged in recent years by Barro (1974) and a number ofother
authors. Their counterargument is often referred to as the
Ricardian Equivalence Proposition.5 They suggest that increases
in budget deficits lead instead to reductions in consumption as
households save in anticipation of future tax liabiljties. Their
argument runs as follows. In the long run, the presentvalue of
the government's tax receipts must equal the present value of its
expenditures. Deficit increasing reductions, in taxes today,
with expenditures held constant, necessarily entail increases in
taxes tomorrow. The present value of the taxes that will be
collected from consumers is unaffected by a tax change. This
means that their wealth is unchanged and thereforethat they
should not alter their consumption decisions. Instead,
households should save the whole of any tax reduction in
anticipation of future tax liabilities. In this case,there will
be no increase in the demand for goods and so interest rates will
6
not rise when the government deficit increases.23
Much of the discussion of the Ricardian equivalence
proposition has centered on whether or not persons currently
alive are likely to be able to use debt to impose burdens on
future generations, thereby making themselves wealthier and
leading to increases in spending. Proponents of the Ricardian
equivalence view have stressed the possibility that any
altruistic parents will tend to offset any burdens imposed on
future generations by increasing their bequests. Skeptics have
dismissed this possibility. In all likelihood, however,
intergenerational transfers are not of great importance in
determining the effects of changes in governmentdeficits.7 The
typical adult consumer has an expected life span of about 35
years. If the government runs a deficit, mostof the burden of
servicing the resulting debt will be borne within his lifetime.
Hence, the opportunities for passing burdens on to future
generations are relatively limited and so are unlikely to cause
deficits to have large effects on consumption spending.
The most serious problem with the Ricardian equivalence
proposition is its extreme assumptions about consumers'
rationality in foreseeing future tax changes. Even where future
tax changes have been legislated, consumers appear not totake
account of them in making their consumption decisions.This is
well illustrated by recent experience. In the summer of 1981, a
three year program of substantial reductions in income taxes was
enacted and government spending was slashed. If consumers acted
in a forward looking way, one would have expected consumption to24
surge immediately and then not to change much atall when the tax
cuts actually took place. In fact, the personal savings rate was
higher in 1981 when the tax cuts were anticipated than in 1982
and 1983 after they took place. Similar patterns have been
observed when other tax changes were announced in advance. If
consumers do not take account of tax changes that have already
been legislated, it seems most unlikely that they consider tax
changes that will ultimately be made necessary by government
deficits.
While the Ricardian equivalence proposition seems
implausible, its validity is ultimately an empirical question.
More generally, in considering the effects of budget deficits, it
would be useful to have estimates of the effects of deficits on
each of the components of GNP. The starting point for an
analysis of this question is the national income accounting
identity:
(1) D—C-T— PS-i-NFl-I
where D represents the total government deficit, PS is private
saving, NFl is net foreign investment and I is domestic
investment. This identity demonstrates that, with GNP held
constant, increases in Federal deficits must raise private
savings, draw funds in from abroad by crowding out net exports,
reduce investment or have some combination of these effects.
I estimate the effects of increases in deficits on the
composition of national output by fitting reduced form equations
of the type:25
(2) Zj/CNPt —aj+bi(D/CNPt)+c(Cycle)+u
where Z, i—l-3 represent components of CNP and Cycle represents
a vector of variables intended to control for cyclical
conditions. The coefficients b measure the extent to which
deficits affect each national income component. In alternative
specifications, Cycle contains controls for contemporaneous and
lagged real growth, and for these variables and contemporaneous
8 and lagged inflation.The equations are estimated using the
total government deficit as reported in the National Income
Accounts. The sample period was 1950-1985. The equations are
not correccted for autocorrelation in order to focus onthe "low
frequency" effects of budget deficits. Results are reported in
Table 2.
Both specifications produce similar results regarding the
effects of budget deficits. Increased budget deficits calls
forth only a negligable amount of extra private savings. Put
differently, they crowd out only very little consumption
expenditure. The data easily refute the prediction of the
Ricardian equivalence view that deficits lead to dollar for
dollar increases in private savings.
The estimates suggest that historically the primary burden
of government deficits has fallen on private investment and net
exports. Each dollar of deficit reduces investment by about60
cents. The three components of investment, non-residential,
residential and changes in inventories are reduced by
approximately equal amounts--about 20 cents apiece.Table 2.
Deficits and the Comoosition of GNP
Real GNP Growth asReal GNP Growth and Inflation























Note:Coefficients indicate the effect of a $1 increase in the
deficit of the federal government and state and local governments on
the indicated variable. The estimated equations relate the percentage
of GNP accounted for by the indicated sector to a constant, atime
trend, the percentage of GNP of the combined budgetdeficits of the
federal government and state and local governments, the
contemporaneous and twice-lagged values ofreal GNP, and, for the
second column, the contemporaneous and once-lagged value of the change
in the CNP deflator. All equations are estimated for the period1950-
1985 except for Non-residential and Residential investment, which,due
to data limitations, are only estimated for the period1950-1984.
Standard errors are in parentheses.26
The results also confirm the prediction that increased
deficits crowd out net exports by attracting foreign capital
inflows. However, the effect appears relatively modest, only
about 25 cents of net exports are crowded out by each 1$ increase
in budget deficits. This is quite likely the result of the
relatively long sample period used in the estimation. The
coincidence of large budget deficits and large current account
deficits at present suggests that in the current flexible
exchange rate environment budget deficits have somewhat larger
effects on net exports. Consequently, their effects on aggregate
investment are probably somewhat smaller than these estimates
imply.
These estimates confirm the conventional view that deficits
have their primary impact on investment, with secondary impacts
on the foreign trade sector of the economy and on private
savings. For this pattern of responses to fluctuationsin the
deficit to be observed, deficits must tend to increase real
interest rates. This suggests that deficits have potentially
serious consequences for economic growth. In assessing these
costs, it is important to recall that deficits are not an
alternative to tax increases or spending cuts. Rather they
simply postpone these actions and increase the sizeof the
adjustment that will ultimately be necessary.27
Federal. Deficits and Financial Stabilit't
The arguments suggesting that Federal deficits distort the
composition of economic activity carry the implicationthat they
may pose threats to financial stability.To the extent that they
raise real interest rates, highly leveraged borrowers are put
under increased financial pressure. The importance of this
effect is difficult to gauge.
Probably more serious are the large sectoral dislocations
associated with increased budget deficits. Financial health
depends more on the balance sheet position of the worstoff parts
of the private sector than it does on the aggregate private
sector balance sheet. Policies, such as those pursued recently,
which lead to large shifts in the composition of output, increase
the demand for some products at the expense of others. From the
point of view of total demand, the shifts may be neutralbut
almost certainly the adverse shocks create more financial
distress than the favorable ones alleviate. The financial
distress of the agricultural sector of the economy, for instance,
is in substantial part, the result of the crowding out of
agricultural exports by the strong dollar.
If this distress and many of the problems faced by the
manufacturing sector are to be ameliorated, profitabilityneeds
to be enhanced. The most direct way of assuring this is
reductions in Federal deficits.28
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND THE TAX STRUCTURE
The overall level of tax collections determines the level of
the Federal deficit and so has ramifications for financial
stability through its effects on the composition of demand.
Changes in the overall level of tax collections do not have a
direct effect on the private sector's incentive to take on risky
debt, but these incentives are directly affected by the structure
of the tax system.
Table 3, drawn from the work of Eugene Steuerle (1985),
illustrates a fundamental and little recognized feature of the
tax system. Total tax collections on interest income are
substantially negative in the United States. Steuerle's
calculations suggest that in 1981, tax deductions for interest
exceeded tax payments on interest income by almost $30 billion.
This reflects primarily two factors. Most importantly, borrowers
tend to be in higher tax brackets than do lenders. For example,
corporations, do a great deal of borrowing while a substantial
amount of debt is held by tax-exempt organizations, pension funds
and other tax favored savings vehicles and foreigners none of
whom pay taxes on interest income. Moreover, underreporting
appears to be much more serious for interest income thanfor
interest deductions.
The fact that total interest tax collections are negative
means that the tax system is subsidizing the use of debt finance.
Whenever a transaction can be structured in a way that enables aTable 3
Estimated Taxes Paid on Interest Income in 1981
(billions of dollars)
Tyoe of Payer or Recioient Taxes Paid.
Interest Paid:
Nonfinancial corporations -48
Sole proprietors and partnerships -18







Source: C. Eugene Steuerle "Tax Arbitrage, Inflation and the
Taxation of Interest Payments and Receipts," Wayne Law Review,
vol. 30 (Spring 1984), p. 1007, as reprinted in Steuerle (1985),
Taxes. Loans and Inflation, p. 55.
Includes a small amount from financial noncorporate business.
Includes receipts of estates and trusts.
Services to businesses.29
high bracket taxpayer to make and deduct interest paymentsto a
low or zero bracket taxpayer, the Treasury loses revenue.
Transactions which can be structured in this way are therefore
subsidized.Tax arbitrae can account for the way in which many
transactions are structured.
Taxes and Corvorate Debt Ecuity Decisions
An obvious example is provided by the issuance of corporate
10 debt. For simplicity, consider initially a corporation whose
future stream of profits is riskiess. It is clear in this case
that in the absence of tax considerations the labelling of claims
on the corporation as debt or equity will be a matterof complete
indifference. But the choice of a means of finance is
consequential given the tax system. When the firm relies on
equity finance, its cash payments to shareholders are not
deductible. On the other hand, when it relies on debt finance,
interest payments to bond-holders are tax deductible. Ifthe
taxation of debt and equity income at the individual level were
identical, individuals would require the same rate of return on
both debt and equity securities. In this case, corporationswould
all rely on debt finance. However, equity is tax favored atthe
individual level because capital gains are taxed preferentially.
This means that individuals will require a higher pre-tax rateof
return on debt than on equity with the size of thedifferential
depending on their tax bracket.30
The ultimate debt equity ratio actually selected by
corporations will depend on the tradeoffof the tax advantages to
deducting debt at the corporate level, againstthe tax advantages
of holding equity at the individual level, and anyassociated
bankruptcy risks. Under current tax rules, there arefew if any
taxpayers for whom the tax advantage toholding equity securities
exceeds the corporate advantage to being able to deductinterest
payments. Debt equity ratios therefore largelyresult from a
balancing of the tax advantages to debt finance againstthe
associated risks. In the absence of the tax advantage to debt,
corporations would find it profitable toissueless debt and take
on fewer risks.
I have highlighted the effects of the tax system onthe
choice of corporate debt equity ratios. Similar logic maybe
applied in other situations. Consider a stocktrader considering
marginning his holdings in order to purchase morestock. If the
interest deductions he receives were exactly matched byinterest
taxes paid by the holder of his debt, the issuanceof debt would
have no effect on total tax collections and the tax systemwould
provide no inducement to leverage. All the tax savingsprovided
by the deductability of interest would beoffset by the higher
interest necessary to compensate debt holders for their tax
burdens. On the other hand, if, as Table 3 suggests, debt
issuers are typically in higher tax brackets than debt holders,
the tax system does provide an incentive to leverage. The
crucial point parallels the analysis of corporate debt equity31
ratios. The tax incentive to debt depends on the difference
between the tax rates of borrowers and lenders. Because this
difference is normally positive the tax system provides
incentives for the private sector to take on more leverage than
it otherwise would.
It is very difficult to gauge the quantitative significance
of tax incentives on private sector financing decisions. One
piece of evidence suggests, however, that it may not be very
large. The last decade has seen reductions in tax rates on
individuals, expansions in the availability of tax sheltered
savings, and sharply higher interest rates, all of which should
have provided significant impetus to the use of debt. But as
Figure 2 illustrated, there has been little or no acceleration in
the long term trend towards the increased use of debt over this
period.
Tax Reform and Financial Stability
It is unlikely that the tax incentives towards the increased
use of private debt will be reduced very much by the tax reform
package currently working its way through the Congress. While
tax reform will reduce marginal tax rates on both firms and
individuals, it is unlikely to reduce the differential between
the tax rate on borrowers and the tax rate on lenders by very
much. Indeed, because the corporate rate will rise relative to
the rates of tax on high income individual taxpayers, it is32
likely that the incentive for corporations to issue debt will be
increased. This effect will be enhanced by increases in capital
gains taxes, which will make equity securities less attractive.
Reductions in after tax corporate profits will reduce internal
finftnce and so will also tend to raise reliance on debt.
While whatever tax reform bill is passed is likely to
contain limits on the deductability of interest for various
purposes, it is far from clear that these will in factbind for
many taxpayers. Many will find it easy to rearrangetheir
borrowing- -by increasing their home mortgage for example- -and so
avoid any limits contained in the law.
In order to reduce the tax incentive to use debt finance, it
is necessary to reform the tax system to narrow the spread
between the rate at which interest is deducted and taxed. This
is likely to be very difficult within the context of an income
tax system which exempts a great deal of interest income from
taxation. Reforms which move in the direction of a consumption
tax and disallow all interest deductions probably offer the best
hope of reducing the tax incentives favoring debt finance. But
such reforms are not likely to be enacted in the near future.
CONCLUSIONS
This analysis of debt problems and their interaction with
macroeconomic policies suggests that insuring financial stability
is primarily a microeconomic policy problem. There is relatively33
little that aggregate fiscal or monetary policies can do to
insure financial stability other than trying to maintain economic
stability. Nor, despite widely expressed concerns about the
increases in various debt ratios, is there cause for generalized
concerns about excessive leverage at present. Given the economic
record of the past decade, aggregate private sector balance
sheets appear surprisingly healthy. The problems that exist are
largely sectoral and so call for microeconomic rather than
macroeconomic remedies.
While financial stability is not a critical macroeconmic
policy problem at the present time, there are important
considerations suggesting that budget deficits have adverse
economic effects. Budget deficits have little effect on the
overall level of output in the current policy environment but
distort the composition of output away from the investment and
export sectors of the economy. The longer the delay until action
is taken to reduce deficits, the larger will be the tax increases
or spending cuts that will ultimately be required.34
Foo tnotes
1. Domestic non-financial debt is defined asthe sum of the
credit market instruments issued by Federal government,state and
local governments, business firms and households.It does not
include the obligations of financial intermediaries.For a
fuller description of its measurement see Friedman (1982).
2. Friedman (1982) emphasizes the stability of thedebt ratio
over periods much longer than the one consideredhere. The
longer term evidence is however difficult to interpret.The
debt-GNP ratio did fluctuate substantially during the Depression
and War years. Whether the similarity of its value inthe l920s
and the post-War period has structural significance orwhether it
is coincidental is difficult to judge.
3. Mankiw and Summers (1986) note that the standard analysisof
the effects of tax induced deficits like those we are not
experiencing depends on the implausible and empirically
-
unsupportedassumption that income and not consumption isthe
proximate determinant of the transactionsdemand for money. If
this assumption is not maintained, it is possible forthe
multiplier to be negative when the money stockis held constant.
4. The relevance of the constant money assumption inthe past is
also highly questionable. In the pre-1970 period, monetary
policy sought at least to some extent to peginterest rates.
Even when monetary policy was explicitly tied tothe monetary35
aggregates1 the existence of fairly broad target rangesfor the
money stock, and adjustments for base drift allowedfor changes
in the money stock in response to fiscal policies.
5. While Ricardo laid out the argument he concluded that it was
unlikely to be valid in practice. My views on the Ricardian
equivalence proposition are laid out in detail in Summers (1985)
upon which the subsequent discussion draws heavily.
6. This analysis is exactly correct for the case of a change in
taxes or a permanent change in government spending. The
Ricardian equivalence view does allow for the possibility that a
transitory increase in government spending will affect national
àavings and interest rates in the short run.
7. The point made here is developed more fully in Poterba and
Summers (1986).
8. For estimates of a wider range of specifications over a
slightly shorter sample period than used here with broadly
similar results see Summers (1986). corroborating evidence from
econometric model simulations is also reported. Because of the
inclusion of cyclical controls, very similar results areotained
using either actual or cyclically adjusted budgetdeficits. With
the annual data used here, the inclusion of lagged deficitsalso
has little impact on the results.
9. The major difference in the results when a correction ismade
for autocorrelation is that deficits are estimated to have a
large impact on savings and a smaller impact on net exports.
10. The discussio,n here explicates the so called "MillerModel"36
of the determination of corporate capital structure. See Miller
(1977) for more details.References
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